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PerceptionRecentmulti-voxel pattern classiﬁcation (MVPC) studies have shown that in early visual cortex patterns of brain
activity generated during mental imagery are similar to patterns of activity generated during perception. This
ﬁnding implies that low-level visual features (e.g., space, spatial frequency, and orientation) are encoded during
mental imagery. However, the speciﬁc hypothesis that low-level visual features are encoded during mental im-
agery is difﬁcult to directly test using MVPC. The difﬁculty is especially acute when considering the representa-
tion of complex, multi-object scenes that can evoke multiple sources of variation that are distinct from low-
level visual features. Therefore, we used a voxel-wise modeling and decoding approach to directly test the hy-
pothesis that low-level visual features are encoded in activity generated during mental imagery of complex
scenes. Using fMRI measurements of cortical activity evoked by viewing photographs, we constructed voxel-
wise encodingmodels of tuning to low-level visual features.We alsomeasured activity as subjects imagined pre-
viouslymemorizedworks of art.We then used the encodingmodels to determine if putative low-level visual fea-
tures encoded in this activity could pick out the imagined artwork from among thousands of other randomly
selected images. We show that mental images can be accurately identiﬁed in this way; moreover, mental
image identiﬁcation accuracy depends upon the degree of tuning to low-level visual features in the voxels select-
ed for decoding. These results directly conﬁrm the hypothesis that low-level visual features are encoded during
mental imagery of complex scenes. Our work also points to novel forms of brain–machine interaction: we pro-
vide a proof-of-concept demonstration of an internet image search guided by mental imagery.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
Spend a few moments examining “Betty” (Fig. 1A, second image
from left), a famous portrait by the artist Gerhard Richter. With eyes
closed generate a mental image of the painting and maintain it for a
few seconds. With eyes again open re-examine the painting. Which of
its basic features were conserved in your mental image? The position
of Betty's head within the center of the frame? The vertical orientation
of her torso? The spatial frequencies induced by the strands of her
hair, the folds of her sweatshirt, or the ﬂoral print along her sleeve?
Low-level visual features such as position, orientation, and spatial
frequency are among the fundamental building blocks of visual percep-
tion. During perception of an external image these features are encodedCarolina, 96 Jonathan Lucas St.,
. This is an open access article underin the activity of early visual cortical areas (i.e., V1 and V2), and provide
an efﬁcient basis for representing complex natural scenes (Olshausen
and Field, 1996). An important and long-standing question in mental
imagery research is whether these same low-level visual features con-
tribute to the representation of complex mental images (Pylyshyn,
2002; Kosslyn et al., 2009).
Most of the fMRI research onmental imagery has addressed a closely
related but importantly different question, namely: are patterns of ac-
tivity in early visual cortex generated during mental imagery similar to
patterns of activity generated during perception? Between 1993 and
2010 at least twenty studies addressed this question by estimating the
amplitude of BOLD activity in early visual areas in subjects engaged
in mental imagery. At least eight studies reported no signiﬁcant activity
above baseline in early visual cortex duringmental imagery (D'Esposito
et al., 1997; Ishai et al., 2000; Knauff et al., 2000; Trojano et al., 2000;
Wheeler et al., 2000; Formisano et al., 2002; Sack et al., 2002; Daselaar
et al., 2010), while at least twelve reported attenuated but signiﬁcantthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
216 T. Naselaris et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 215–228activity (Le Bihan et al., 1993; Sabbah et al., 1995; Goebel et al., 1998;
Chen et al., 1998; Klein et al., 2000; O'Craven and Kanwisher, 2000;
Ishai et al., 2002; Lambert et al., 2002; Ganis et al., 2004; Handy et al.,
2004; Amedi et al., 2005; Cui et al., 2007). Recent evidence suggests
that the discrepancy can be explained by differences in experimental
factors (Kosslyn and Thompson, 2003) and variation in the vividness
of mental imagery across individuals (Cui et al., 2007). Thus, it is safeto conclude that primary visual cortex is weakly but signiﬁcantly acti-
vated by mental imagery.
In recent years at least three studies have used multivoxel pattern
classiﬁcation (MVPC) to measure the similarity between patterns of ac-
tivity during imagery and perception in early visual cortex (Cichy et al.,
2011; Lee et al., 2012; Albers et al., 2013). MVPC is a useful tool for
studying mental imagery because it is sensitive to information that is
217T. Naselaris et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 215–228encoded inmulti-voxel patterns of activity even when the amplitude of
the activity is attenuated. The recent MVPC studies have shown that
patterns of activity generated during mental imagery in V1 and V2 are
discriminable; speciﬁcally, pattern classiﬁers that accurately discrimi-
nate patterns of activity generated during perception of simple external
stimuli can also discriminate patterns of activity generated duringmen-
tal imagery of the same stimuli. MVPC studies that targeted high-order
visual areas have shown similarity between activity patterns in those vi-
sual areas as well (Stokes et al., 2009; Reddy et al., 2010; Johnson and
Johnson, 2014). Results fromMVPC studies investigating visualworking
memory (Harrison and Tong, 2009; Xing et al., 2013), and dreaming
(Horikawa et al., 2013) also support the notion that patterns of activity
generated during mental imagery and perception are similar in some
way.
The ﬁnding that patterns of activity in early visual cortex during
imagery are similar to patterns of activity during perception im-
plies—but does not directly demonstrate—that low-level visual fea-
tures are represented in both imagery and perception. In fact, this
speciﬁc hypothesis is difﬁcult to test using MVPC (or activation anal-
ysis) because MVPC does not provide an explicit model of the many
sources of variation that can contribute to activity patterns during
imagery and perception. It is well-established that low-level visual
features are not the only source of variation in activity in early visual
areas. Additional sources of variation include attention (Kamitani
and Tong, 2005), reward expectation (Serences, 2008), the percep-
tion of coherent shape (Murray et al., 2002), global context (Joo
et al., 2012), and even auditory stimulation (Vetter et al., 2014).
Any one of these distinct sources of variation could induce similarity
between activity patterns generated during imagery and perception.
To directly test hypotheses about low-level visual features it is there-
fore essential to isolate the speciﬁc component of variation in activ-
ity that is due to low-level visual features. This can be done
experimentally using reduced stimuli that depict only low-level vi-
sual features (e.g., an oriented grating); however, perception and
imagery of multi-object, complex scenes will inevitably tap sources
of variation that cannot be experimentally controlled. Thus, when
considering mental imagery of complex scenes (the class of stimuli
that is clearly most relevant to mental imagery as it occurs in every-
day cognition), it is important to adopt an approach that provides
analytical control over the multiple sources of variation in activity
patterns.
Here we use a voxel-wise modeling and decoding approach
(Naselaris et al., 2011) to demonstrate directly that low-level visual fea-
tures are encoded in activity generated during mental imagery of com-
plex scenes recalled from memory. The voxel-wise encoding model
characterizes tuning of activity in each voxel to retinotopic location,
spatial frequency and orientation. Unlike activation andMVPC analyses,
the encoding model approach isolates the speciﬁc component of varia-
tion in activity that is due to low-level visual features. This component
is then used to identify the mental image associated with a measured
pattern of activity. Consequently, decoding is directly linked to the rep-
resentation of low-level visual features, and can only succeed if the fea-
tures are encoded in the activity of the voxels selected to performFig. 1. Experimental design. A) Prior to scanning subjects familiarized themselves with ﬁve work
themodel-ﬁtting (left) andmodel-testing (not shown) runs subjects ﬁxated a central dot while vi
was preceded by a brief dummy cue (“000”; duration = 0.6 s) and followed by a blank gray scree
only the ﬁve works of art. Each artwork was preceded by a distinct 3-letter cue (an abbreviatio
(right) were identical to perception runs except that subjects imagined the ﬁve works of art
C) High-ﬁeld (7-Tesla) fMRImeasurements of BOLD activity in the occipital lobewere obtained d
voxel-wise encodingmodels (bottom left). The voxel-wise encodingmodels and activity from the
same voxel-wise encoding models and activity from the imagery runs (right) were used to perf
(outlined in blue/orange for the perception/imagery runs) is picked out from among a set of rand
duce predicted activity an observed or imagined scene (s) is ﬁltered through a bank of 570 comp
spatial frequency, spatial location, and orientation (four examples shown here). The ﬁlter output
passed through a compressive nonlinearity (f(s)= log(1+ |WTs|); outputs are represented by th
to light blue lines indicate negative parameters; yellow to red lines indicate positive parameters).
stimulus. The model parameters (h) are learned from the training data only and characterize eadecoding. Indeed, our key result is that the accuracy of mental image
decoding is directly dependent upon how well-tuned the underlying
voxel activity is to low-level visual features during perception.
An additional advantage of our encoding model-based approach is
that, unlikeMVPC analysis, it is not constrained by a ﬁxed set of catego-
ries or restricted to any speciﬁc stimulus class (e.g., gratings). Our ap-
proach thus opens opportunities for mental imagery to mediate
interactions between brain and machine that are not conceivable with
MVPC-based decoding. Here we show that our approach can be used
to sort the images returned by an internet search query according to
their low-level similarity to a speciﬁc mental image.Results
We used fMRI to measure blood oxygenation-level dependent
(BOLD) activity in the visual cortex of three subjects. Scanningwas con-
ducted at 7-Tesla in order to exploit the sensitivity and speciﬁcity
gains provided by ultrahigh ﬁelds (Yacoub et al., 2001; Olman and
Yacoub, 2011). Each scanning session consisted of interleaved model-
ﬁtting, model-testing, perception, and imagery runs (Fig. 1B). During the
model-ﬁtting and model-testing runs subjects ﬁxated a small square
at the center of the visual ﬁeld while passively viewing a sequence of
brieﬂy presented color photographs. During the imagery runs subjects
were cued to generate mental images of ﬁve previously memorized
works of art (Fig. 1A) while ﬁxating a small square at the center of a
blank gray screen. A perception run preceded each imagery run and
was identical to it except that subjects viewed the works of art instead
of generating mental images of them.
Brain activity measured during the model-ﬁtting runs was used to
construct a voxel-wise encoding model for each voxel in the acquired
functional volumes (Fig. 1C, left). The encoding model is based upon a
Gabor wavelet decomposition of input images and characterizes tuning
to low-level visual features (Fig. 1D). Previous studies (Kay et al., 2008;
Naselaris et al., 2009; Nishimoto et al., 2011) have shown that Gabor-
wavelet encodingmodels are able to predict activity in individual voxels
evoked by arbitrary visual stimuli. As in these previous publications, we
identiﬁed the voxels thatwere accurately characterized by the encoding
model by calculating the correlation betweenmodel predictions and ac-
tivity measured during the model-testing runs (images in the model-
ﬁtting and model-testing runs did not overlap and did not include the
artwork in the perception and imagery runs). The distribution of corre-
lation coefﬁcients (referred to as model prediction accuracy) across all
voxels has a single mode at 0 and a heavy tail (Fig. 2A). The mode indi-
cates that themodel does not accurately predict activity for a large frac-
tion of voxels, while the tail indicates that there is a subset of voxels for
which model predictions are quite accurate (Naselaris et al., 2009). As
expected, this subset ofwell-tuned voxels includes the voxels in early vi-
sual areas V1 and V2 (Fig. 2A, inset) and is restricted to voxels that oc-
cupy cortical gray matter (pink voxels in Fig. 2B). Voxels for which
model predictions are extremely poor are scattered throughout white
matter from the posterior to anterior boundaries of the slice prescrip-
tion (blue voxels in Fig. 2B).s of art. B) Scans were organized into separate runs of contiguous trials. During each trial of
ewing randomly selected photographs (duration of presentation = 1.4 s). Each photograph
n (mean duration = 4 s). During each trial of the perception runs (middle) subjects viewed
n of the artist's name) and followed by a blank gray screen (duration = 4 s). Imagery runs
while ﬁxating at the center of a gray screen that was 1.4% brighter than the cue screen.
uring each run. Activitymeasured during themodel-ﬁtting runs (left) was used to construct
perception runs (middle)were used to perform image identiﬁcation (bottommiddle). The
ormmental image identiﬁcation (bottom right). During image identiﬁcation a target image
omly selected images. D) A simpliﬁed illustration of the voxel-wise encodingmodel. To pro-
lex Gabor wavelets (represented by the matrixW). Each wavelet is speciﬁed by a particular
s (|WTs|, where | | denotes an absolute value operation that removes phase information) are
e grayscale bar at top) and thenmultiplied by a set ofmodel parameters (colored lines; dark
The sumof theweighted ﬁlter outputs is the voxel's predicted activity (v) in response to the
ch voxel's tuning to spatial frequency, spatial location, and orientation.
Fig. 2. Voxel-wise encodingmodel performance and voxel-binning procedure. A) Histogram of voxel-wise encodingmodel prediction accuracy for all voxels in the functional volume ac-
quired for Subject 1. For each voxel the model prediction accuracy is the correlation between the encoding model predictions and activity measured during the model-testing runs. The
histogram has a mode near 0 and a heavy tail that is more easily appreciated on a log scale (inset). B) Overlay of model prediction accuracy onto a single axial slice (Subject 1). Voxels in
which activity is poorly predicted (shown in blue) are scattered throughout white matter across the posterior–anterior extent of the scanned area. Voxels in which activity is accurately
predicted (shown in pink) are conﬁned to graymatter and thus track the convolutions of the cortical surface. C) To facilitate the image identiﬁcation analyses voxels were rank-ordered by
model prediction accuracy and then binned into populations each containing 1000 voxels. Populations are illustrated as circles surrounding schematized voxels (squares) whose color
indicates model prediction accuracy. Low-rank populations (blue) contain poorly tuned voxels that had low prediction accuracy. High-rank populations (pink) contained well-tuned
voxels that had high prediction accuracy. The lower (upper) bound on prediction accuracy for a population is determined by the voxel in the population with the lowest (highest)
model prediction accuracy. D) The percent of early visual area (EVA; V1 and V2) voxels in each of the voxel populations used for image identiﬁcation. The x-axis indicates the lower
bound on model prediction accuracy for each population. The left y-axis indicates the percentage of the voxels in EVA across all populations with a lower-bound greater than or equal
to the value on the x-axis. The right y-axis indicates the percentage of voxels in EVA in each population relative to the percentage of voxels in EVA in the functional volume (~2% for all
subjects). The black curve shows how the percentage increases as the lower-bound on model accuracy increases. In the population with the highest lower bound N20% of the voxels
are in EVA. This is greater than 9 times the percent of voxels in EVA contained in the functional volume. The dashed line indicates the absolute (left y-axis) and relative (right y-axis) per-
centage of voxels in EVA that would be obtained if populations were constructed by randomly sampling voxels from the functional volume.
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external and mental image identiﬁcation using the activity from the
perception and imagery runs, respectively (Fig. 1C). Image identiﬁcation
is a decodingmethod that enables direct detection of putative low-level
visual features encoded in voxel activity. With image identiﬁcation, pu-
tative low-level features are detected by correlatingmeasured brain ac-
tivity against activity predicted by the voxel-wise encoding models. If
the low-level visual features of a target image are encoded in measured
brain activity, then themeasured brain activity should bemore correlat-
ed withmodel predictions in response to the target image than to other
randomly selected photographs. Via this logic, a single target image
is identiﬁed by picking it out from a gallery of hundreds, thousands, or
millions of other images (Kay et al., 2008) (Note that thismethod is rad-
ically different fromMVPC, in which a single object category is discrim-
inated from a small number of other categories using any aspect of the
underlying activity that makes it discriminable). Of course, this method
of decodingdepends entirely upon the accuracy of the encodingmodels.
If the encodingmodels do a poor job of predicting the activity of the un-
derlying voxels, correlations between measured and predicted activity
will be random and decoding will fail. Image identiﬁcation thus pro-
vides a direct test of the hypothesis that the low-level visual features
of remembered scenes are encoded in activity generated during mental
imagery. If the hypothesis is true, remembered scenes should be accu-
rately identiﬁed whenever the encoding models are accurate; identiﬁ-
cation accuracy should otherwise be poor.To test the hypothesis, we segregated (Fig. 2C) well-tuned voxels
(whose activity was accurately predicted by the encoding model)
from poorly-tuned voxels (whose activity was poorly predicted by the
model). Speciﬁcally, we rank-ordered the voxels based on model
prediction accuracy and then grouped them into populations of
1000 voxels based on the ranking. The ~1000 distinct populations con-
structed by this procedure varied smoothly from populations whose
voxels were poorly tuned (e.g., voxels in white matter or in non-
responsive cortex) to populations whose voxels were well-tuned
(e.g., early visual cortex; Fig. 2D). External andmental image identiﬁca-
tion was then performed independently for each population. The mea-
sure of identiﬁcation accuracy for each population was a simple tally
of hits: whenever predicted activity in response to the artwork was
more correlatedwithmeasured activity than the predicted activity in re-
sponse to a set of randomly selected photos, a hitwas tallied. A thousand
such comparisons were made using one thousand sets of randomly se-
lected photos; perfect image identiﬁcation would therefore correspond
to one thousandhits, while chancewould correspond to 500 (see Fig. S1
for an illustration of the analysis).
Our key results are shown in Fig. 3 (see also Fig. S2). As expected, ex-
ternal images could be accurately identiﬁed using activity from the per-
ception runs, and identiﬁcation accuracy depended directly upon the
accuracy of the underlying encoding models. Median image identiﬁca-
tion accuracy varied monotonically with the prediction accuracy of the
voxel-wise encoding models (Fig. 3, blue lines), indicating that activity
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identiﬁcation, while activity sampled from populations of well-tuned
voxels produced excellent image identiﬁcation accuracy.
The same pattern of results was observed for mental images identiﬁed
using activity from the imagery runs. Median mental image identiﬁca-
tion accuracy varied monotonically with the prediction accuracy of the
voxel-wise encoding models (Fig. 3, orange lines). For populations
of well-tuned voxels mental image identiﬁcation accuracy was well
above chance (p b .01, permutation test) and in subjects 1 and 3
approached the accuracy of external image identiﬁcation. Special
voxel populations consisting exclusively of well-tuned voxels from V1(Fig. 3, triangles) or V2 (squares) were consistent with these ﬁndings.
This result directly demonstrates that low-level visual features of re-
membered complex scenes are encoded in activity during mental
imagery.
The fact that an encodingmodel for early visual areas can be used to
accurately identify mental images suggests that current understanding
of visual processing is already sufﬁcient to exploit mental imagery for
use in a brain–machine interface. As a proof-of-concept, we considered
an image-search task in which a speciﬁc artworkmust be selected from
among a gallery of internet images associated with an artist's name. In
this scenario, a user has observed an artwork by a known artist, but can-
not remember the title of the work. In principle, the brain activity asso-
ciated with a mental image of the artwork could be used to pick it out
from a digital gallery of images returned by an internet query on the
artist's name.
We performed a Google Images query on the names of each artist
whose work was sampled in our experiment. For each artist 100 of
the images returned by the query were downloaded and saved. The
majority of images returned by the query were artwork by the artists,
although images of book jackets, gallery photos, and unrelatedmiscella-
nywere also returned.We then used the voxel-wise encodingmodels to
predict the brain activity that would be evoked by viewing each of the
100 downloaded images. We rank-ordered the images according to
how closely their predicted activity resembled the activity generated
during mental imagery. This procedure consistently assigned high
ranks to the imagined artwork (Figs. 4B and 5B). For example, 90% of
the time the imagined artwork was ranked in the top 50; 20% of the
time it was ranked in the top 10 (Fig. 4B). These rankings are lower
than the rankings for the perceived artwork (Figs. 4A and 5A) but are
signiﬁcantly higher than expected by chance (p b .0001; permutation
test). A breakdown of results by individual image (Figs. 4C and D) and
subject (Figs. 4E and F) shows that accurate decoding is not driven by
any single image or subject (although the pattern of variation in accura-
cy across artwork and subjects may reveal important information; see
Differences between mental imagery and perception section). Inspec-
tion of the sorted galleries (Fig. 5) suggests that obviously irrelevant im-
ages (Figs. 5A and B, “worst” ﬁve images in the ﬁrst 3 rows) were
assigned low rankings. Images assigned high rankings typically had
one or two structural features in common with the perceived/imagined
artwork (e.g., the contour of the stained-glass window in the Richter
block of Fig. 5A; the high-frequency textures in the El Greco blocks of
Figs. 5A and B).
These results demonstrate the power of the encoding modeling ap-
proach for decoding mental imagery, and establish the feasibility of
using brain activity driven bymental imagery to perform useful compu-
tational tasks.Fig. 3. Accurate identiﬁcation of mental imagery depends upon accuracy of encoding
models. Each panel displays data for a single subject. Each dot corresponds to a single pop-
ulation of 1000 voxels. Triangles and squares indicate populations formed exclusively
from voxels in V1 and V2, respectively. For each voxel population image identiﬁcation
accuracy was quantiﬁed by correlating the measured response to the ﬁve works of art
presented during theperception runs (blue) or imagery runs (orange) against the encoding
models' predicted response to the ﬁve works of art. The measured activity was also corre-
lated against the predicted response to 1000 sets of ﬁve randomly selected images. Accura-
cy of image identiﬁcation was quantiﬁed as the number of hits, which are cases where the
predicted responses to the perceived/imaginedworks of art weremore correlatedwith the
measured response than the predicted responses to the randomly selected images. The po-
sition of each dot along the y-axis indicates the image identiﬁcation accuracy in hits for the
voxel population. Position along the x-axis indicates the lowest model prediction accuracy
(i.e., the lower-bound) of all voxels in the population. Solid curves show the cumulativeme-
dian image identiﬁcation accuracy (y-axis; blue = perception, orange = imagery) of all
voxel populations whose lower-bound is greater than or equal to the model prediction ac-
curacy indicated on the x-axis (i.e., all voxel populations to the right of the lower bound in-
dicated on the x-axis). The median identiﬁcation performance for both perception and
imagery increases monotonically as the lower-bound on model prediction accuracy in-
creases. Chance performance is indicated by the black line near hits = 500; a statistical sig-
niﬁcance threshold of p b .01 (permutation test) is indicated by gray shading. These data
establish that accurate identiﬁcation ofmental images is possible anddepends upon the ac-
curacy of the underlying encoding model.
Fig. 4.Artists' galleries sorted bymental imagery. A–B) Effect of population size onmental image identiﬁcation.Measured activity in populations of 100, 1000, or 10,000 voxelswas used to
sort digital galleries associated with each of the ﬁve artists whose artwork was used in our experiments. Voxel populations were created by random sampling of the 30,000 voxels with
highest model prediction accuracy. Activity measured in these populations was used to rank-order the perceived or imagined artworkwith respect to 100 images retrieved from a Google
Images query on each artist's name. For each voxel populationmeasured responseswere correlated against the response predicted by the voxel-wise encodingmodels to all the images for
a speciﬁc artist (including the artwork that was perceived/imagined during the experiment). Images were then ranked according to the strength of the correlation between themeasured
and predicted responses. The cumulative histograms show the cumulative probability (y-axis) of rankings (x-axis) for the artwork actually perceived (blue–violet curves inA) or imagined
(yellow–orange curves in B) during the experiment. Rankings vary from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). Chance performance is indicated by gray curves (10,000 cumulative histograms obtained
by random permutation of rankings). Rankings are signiﬁcantly higher than expected by chance wherever the histograms for perception and imagery runs dip below the histograms for
chance performance. In these panels data for all subjects and artworks are combined. C–D)Mental image identiﬁcation accuracy for individual artworks. In these panels data for all subjects
were pooled and the number of voxels per population was ﬁxed at 1000. Thumbnail images indicate artwork corresponding to each curve. Although no single artwork can account for the
ability to decodemental images using low-level features, there ismore variation in decoding accuracy across artworks for mental images than perceived images. E–F)Mental image iden-
tiﬁcation accuracy for individual subjects. In these panels data for all artworks were pooled and the number of voxels per population was ﬁxed at 1000. Each curve corresponds to a dif-
ferent subject (labeled S1, S2, and S3). Identiﬁcation accuracy varies more across subjects for mental images than for perceived images.
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Fig. 5. Examples of sorted artist's galleries. Each 3 × 10 block of images shows how the images returned by the Google Images query for a single artist (named in the lower right corner of
each block) were sorted by the decoding procedure. Rowswithin each block correspond to one population of 1000 voxels. For each block the three populations selected for display were
the three “best” in the sense that activity evoked by the perceived or imagined artwork were more highly correlated with model predictions in these populations than in all other pop-
ulations. Columns indicate the ranking of each image. The top 5 images are shown to the left of the small vertical division within each block. The bottom 5 images are shown to the
right of the division. In the perceived works of art are outlined in blue. In B the imagined works of art are outlined in orange. Data for all three subjects are pooled in this ﬁgure.
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We have addressed the long-standing issue of whether basic
elements of visual perception—what we have called low-level visual
features—are conserved duringmental imagery. We have directly dem-
onstrated that they are conserved: low-level visual features in complex
scenes (here, works of art) are encoded in brain activity generated dur-
ingmental imagery.Weweremotivated to address this issue because of
its historical obstinacy and its relevance to currently inﬂuential theories
of perception. Three key innovations were deployed: a voxel-wise
encoding model, the use of complex scenes as targets for mental imag-
ery, and a voxel-selection procedure that depends upon tuning to low-
level visual features instead of pre-determined regions of interest.
Belowwe discuss these motivations and innovations, address some po-
tential confounds, and speculate on the future of brain–machine inter-
faces driven by mental imagery.Mental imagery research in the past century
For most, mental imagery is a salient and obviously critical compo-
nent of mental life that is experienced as an imprecise approximation
to seeing. However, since the turn of the century inﬂuential philoso-
phers and experimental psychologists have objected to this intuitive
characterization of mental imagery, arguing that mental imagery is
not a critical component of mental life, that it is unrelated to the phe-
nomenon of seeing, and that it cannot be usefully described in visual
terms. Fromearly tomid-century, inﬂuential theories ofmental imagery
emphasized its “cognitive unimportance” (Thomas, 2014) and lack
of clear functional role in reasoning or language (Thorndike, 1907;
Sartre, 1936; Ryle, 1949; Wittgenstein, 1953). During the Behaviorist
era of psychology mental imagery was largely ignored as a topic of re-
search and was in fact argued to be non-existent (Watson, 1913).
When interest in mental imagery resumed in the 1970s, experimental
222 T. Naselaris et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 215–228data suggesting that mental images, like external images, are represen-
tations of visual features (e.g., objects, edges, textures, and so on) dis-
tributed across visual space (Podgorny and Shepard, 1978; Kosslyn
et al., 1978) were countered by “non-depictive” or “propositional” ac-
counts of mental imagery (Pylyshyn, 1973). Such accounts held that
the apparent similarity between perception and mental imagery and
the subjective experience of visually inspecting mental images do not
indicate a shared depictive format for visual perception and mental
imagery. Debates about the depictiveness of mental imagery have
dominated mental imagery research for the past three decades (see
Pylyshyn, 2002 and Kosslyn et al., 2009 for reviews of the arguments).
The availability of fMRI, beginning in the 1990s, has not by itself
been sufﬁcient to resolve any of the debates about mental imagery. As
we argue below, the analytical techniques required to directly test
hypotheses about the visual features putatively encoded in brain activ-
ity during mental imagery of complex scenes have only recently been
developed. From this historical perspective, the signiﬁcance of our
work is that it provides the most direct demonstration to date that
activity generated during visual perception and mental imagery of
complex scenes encodes the same low-level visual features. The low-
level, Gabor-like features encoded during mental imagery and percep-
tion are clearly depictive since they characterize visual features
(e.g., spatial frequency) at speciﬁc regions of visual space and accurately
characterize the visual mechanisms that operate during stimulus-
driven perception (Kay et al., 2008; Naselaris et al., 2009). Our result
thus provides a critical and until now missing piece of evidence in sup-
port of depictive theories and—more generally—of the intuitive charac-
terization of mental imagery.
Mental imagery and predictive coding theory
The feedforward pathway into the early visual areas (EVA) is one of
the most well-understood aspects of visual processing. Knowledge of
the functional role of the feedback pathway into EVA is much less
well-developed. Anatomical studies have revealed that EVA receives
feedback projections from higher-order visual areas (Rockland and
Pandya, 1979; Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Markov et al., 2014a).
The feedback projections are believed to be critical for visual processing
(Angelucci et al., 2002; Bullier, 2006; Markov et al., 2014b), but their
precise functional role is currently unknown.What, if anything, is repre-
sented by EVA when it is activated without retinal input?
One compelling answer has been advanced by the predictive coding
theory of vision (Gregory, 1980; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Lee and
Mumford, 2003; Yuille and Kersten, 2006; Bastos et al., 2012). Accord-
ing to this theory feedback corresponds to the outputs of an internal, hi-
erarchical model of the visual environment (see Berkes et al., 2011 for a
recent experimental test of this idea). The top nodes of the model hier-
archy are equated with higher-order visual areas (Lee and Mumford,
2003). Feedback projections from these areas send representations of
the objects in predicted, imagined or remembered scenes to EVA.
When driven by this internal feedback, activity at any one location in
EVA indicates that the visual features depicted by local receptive ﬁelds
would probably be detected if the objects in the scene were presented
to the retina (Albright, 2012). Thus a basic prediction of predictive cod-
ing theory is that, given an accuratemodel of the receptive ﬁelds in EVA,
it should be possible to accurately decode the visual features associated
with remembered scenes from activity that is driven entirely by internal
feedback.
We have tested this basic prediction by using a voxel-wise encoding
model for early visual areas to decode mental images of remembered
scenes. Our results support predictive coding theory by conﬁrming the
existence of signals in early visual areas that are not driven by retinal
input and encode visual features of objects that need not be present.
Other critical components of predictive coding theory—such as the exis-
tence of signals that encode prediction errors—were not tested here.
Nonetheless, our study suggests that mental imagery can be effectivelyexploited to further test predictive coding theory. Mental imagery is by
deﬁnition internally generated and therefore provides an ideal point of
leverage for experimentallymanipulating the visual features encoded in
internal feedback.
Advantages of the encoding model approach for studying mental imagery
Our study used an encoding model and image identiﬁcation ap-
proach to study mental imagery. Previously this approach had only
been applied to visual perception (Kay et al., 2008). In what follows
we will refer to this approach as the voxel-wise modeling and decoding
method, or VM. VM is the only method we are aware of that is capable
of directly answering the speciﬁc question posed here. It is therefore im-
portant to discuss howVMdiffers from themore frequently-usedmeth-
od of MVPC.
MVPC trades on the (dis)similarity between patterns of activity
measured during differing sensory or cognitive states. Under MVPC,
activity patterns are classiﬁed by measuring their (distance from) simi-
larity to a classiﬁcation boundary. In the case of support vector classiﬁ-
cation the classiﬁcation boundary is itself ameasured activity pattern. In
the case of linear discriminant analysis the classiﬁcation boundary is a
linear combination of measured activity patterns.
Important questions about mental imagery have been answered by
using MVPC to effectively compare the similarity of activity patterns
generated during imagery and other sensory or cognitive states. Two re-
cent excellent studies provide cases in point. In Lee et al. (2012) MVPC
was used to reveal a gradient of similarity between perception and
mental imagery along the cortical visual processing hierarchy. Their re-
sults indicate that the relationship between perception and imagery
varies along different stages of visual processing. In Albers et al.
(2013) MVPC was used to reveal a fundamental similarity between ac-
tivity generated during visual working memory and mental imagery.
Their results serve as a critical starting point for consolidating the exten-
sive and largely parallel literatures onworkingmemory andmental im-
agery (Harrison and Tong, 2009; Tong, 2013).
Yet despite its obvious utility, MVPC remains a fundamentally inad-
equate tool for addressing the speciﬁc question posed here, namely:
is the representation of low-level visual features conserved duringmen-
tal imagery? MVPC is inadequate because it provides no means of
decomposing patterns of brain activity into their distinct sources of var-
iation. Even in V1, patterns of brain activity are composed of multiple
distinct sources of variation. For example, activity in V1 in response to
simple line elements can vary signiﬁcantly depending upon whether
the stimuli is perceived as a coherent object or a collection of indepen-
dent lines (Murray et al., 2002). BecauseMVPC simply compares activity
patterns to one another, it cannot discriminate between the speciﬁc
contributions that top-down factors (such as the perception of a coher-
ent object) and low-level visual features (such as the orientation of
lines) make in determining patterns of activity. Thus, MVPC can reveal
that two patterns of activity are similar, but reveals very little about
why. This is the fundamental limitation of MVPC.
An extreme example of this limitation can be found in a recent
study that elegantly exploited it to solve a difﬁcult engineering
problem. Sorger et al. (2012) designed an fMRI-based speller that can
accurately and rapidly read-out letters from patterns of brain activity.
The authors constructed an ingenious combinatorial code for letters
by arbitrarily associating each letter in the alphabet (plus a blank
space) with one of three cognitive tasks, onset delays, and task dura-
tions (for a total of 27 different states). They then used a pattern classi-
ﬁer to identify letters by discriminating activation patterns associated
with the particular combination of task parameters assigned to each let-
ter. Letter read-out was remarkably accurate and the study is unques-
tionably an important advance in the development of brain-driven
spellers. Most germane to this discussion, however, is the fact that accu-
rate decoding of letters was achieved in Sorger et al. by applying MVPC
to patterns of activity that had nothing to do with the native
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binatorial code intentionally embedded in the experimental design—in
other words, someone unaware of the hidden sources of variation—it
would be natural to incorrectly infer that the accurate decoding report-
ed in this study revealed something about how the brain represents let-
ters. The Sorger et al. study provides an excellent demonstration that
pattern classiﬁers can produce accurate decodingwhile revealing noth-
ing about how the decoded stimuli are represented in the brain.
The fundamental limitation of MVPC can be partially circumvented
via experiments that reduce or tightly control the multiple sources of
variation that contribute to patterns of brain activity. Most studies on
mental imagery have in fact adopted this approach, using extremely re-
duced visual stimuli such as blobs (Thirion et al., 2006), wedges
(Slotnick et al., 2005), or gratings (Albers et al., 2013) for their experi-
ments. However, the use of reduced stimuli necessarily entails a reduc-
tion in the generality of the experimental results. In using MVPC one is
therefore forced to accept a trade-off between complexity and general-
ity. Since the goal of this studywas to understandmental images gener-
ated under natural conditions, we were compelled to use another
approach.
The VMmethod was used in our study because it avoids the funda-
mental limitation of MVPC without sacriﬁcing generality. When
decoding is successful using VM, it is very clear why. This is because
VM trades on the similarity between measured patterns of activity
and thepredictions of an encodingmodel. The predictions of the encoding
model represent a single, explicit source of variation due entirely to the
visual features embedded in the model itself. In our case, these features
were Gabor wavelets that were each speciﬁed by a retinotopic location,
spatial frequency, and orientation. If these features are not encoded in
the measured activity, model predictions will be meaningless and
decoding will fail. Conversely, if decoding succeeds, it can only be be-
cause the features embedded in the model are encoded in the activity.
VM thus provides a method for directly testing if a speciﬁc set of fea-
tures is encoded in activity. Because encoding models are designed to
be applied to stimuli of arbitrary complexity (e.g., natural scenes), this
boost in inferential power (relative to MVPC) comes at no cost to
generality.
The importance of using an encoding model to perform decoding
was previously articulated in Thirion et al. (2006). In their landmark
study, Thirion et al. designed a voxel-wise model of tuning to
retinotopic location (i.e., a receptive ﬁeldmodel) and then used it to de-
codemental images of high-contrast blobs in various domino conﬁgura-
tions. Prior to the currentwork it was unclearwhether the results of the
Thirion et al. study would generalize to complex mental images gener-
ated by remembering a natural scene. As we argue below, the ability to
investigate the representation of complex, naturalistic scenes is critical-
ly important for understanding mental imagery.
The importance of complex natural scenes for studying mental imagery
The perception of complex scenes engages multiple levels of visual
processing. Mental imagery of complex scenes need not. One's mental
image of “Betty” could consist of only those features most essential to
the painting's appeal (e.g., the source and softness of its illumination,
or the eyes of Betty's unseen face), and omit (or sample very sparsely)
the low-level features we have decoded in the current work. In fact,
many distinct mental images of “Betty” could in principle be generated
by randomly sampling any subset of features in the painting. Many of
the mental images generated in this way would not be consistent with
the hypothesis that low-level features are encoded duringmental imag-
ery. Thus, the use of complex scenes in our experiment provided a ro-
bust and rigorous test of our hypothesis.
Mental imagery of complex scenes is subjectively very similar to
mental imagery that accompanies recall of long-term memories. Thus,
the use of complex scenes as targets for mental imagery mimics the
kind of mental imagery that occurs during everyday mental life. Sincewe have shown that low-level visual features play a role in mental im-
agery of complex scenes, we can infer that these features are likely to
support memory recall as it occurs in the course of everyday mental
life. It is unclear if mental imagery of reduced stimuli is comparable to
mental imagery that occurs naturally. Thus, it would be difﬁcult to
infer if low-level visual features encoded during mental imagery of re-
duced stimuli play any broader role in cognition.
Selection by tuning, not area
All fMRI studies that deploy a decoding analysis must include some
rational, objective procedure for selecting the voxels that are used to
perform decoding. In this study we selected voxel populations based
upon encodingmodel prediction accuracy. This procedurewas a natural
one in our case because it facilitated a straightforward test of our hy-
pothesis. A more conventional choice would have been to simply select
voxels from early visual areas (V1 and V2), but this was less appropriate
for two reasons. First, our hypothesis concerned the encoding of speciﬁc
visual features, not the engagement of speciﬁc visual areas. By ranking
voxels according to their degree of tuning we were able to test if fea-
tures were encoded in activity independent of the visual area from
which activity was sampled. Second, our procedure for voxel selection
afforded a more robust test of our hypothesis than selection based
upon region-of-interest. This is because our procedure sampled image
identiﬁcation accuracy in multiple voxel populations. The importance
of this resampling can be seen in Fig. 3. For voxel populations that are
not tuned to low-level visual features there is a broad distribution of
image identiﬁcation accuracy. The distribution is exactly what would
be expected if decoding accuracy were sampled randomly from a uni-
form distribution, leading to the correct conclusion that activity in
voxels that are not tuned encodes no information about low-level visual
features. If only one voxel population representative of well- and
poorly-tuned voxels, respectively, had been sampled the results could
have easily led to spurious conclusions.
Although our decision to select by tuning instead of area was appro-
priate and well-motivated, the question of the relative contributions of
distinct visual areas to the representation ofmental imagery is extreme-
ly important. For example, the results of Lee et al. (2012) suggest that
mental imagery and perception converge toward parity with ascension
of the visual hierarchy. Using our analysis, the quality of tuning to low-
level visual features is a stronger determinant of decoding accuracy than
visual area. Therefore, to examine this issue with the VM approach,
encoding models that capture the basic representation in intermediate
visual areas will be needed. The Gabor-wavelet encoding model used
here is appropriate for V1 and V2, but it is increasingly less appropriate
for V3, V4, etc. Although predictive encoding models for intermediate
visual areas are under development, to our knowledge none are cur-
rently mature enough to use for studying mental images of complex
scenes.
Potential confounds
Of potential concern is the possibility that our encodingmodel inad-
vertently captured tuning to object category via the correlations be-
tween object category and low-level features that may occur in
natural scenes. However, it has been shown repeatedly in previous
studies (Naselaris et al., 2009; Çukur et al., 2013) that the encoding
model used here correlates poorly with object categories in natural
scenes; therefore, we can safely rule out the possibility that identiﬁca-
tion of mental images depends upon object-category tuning that is cor-
related with tuning to low-level features.
Another potential concern is the possibility of a circumstantial corre-
lation between the three-letter cues and the artworks we used in the
study. Speciﬁcally, the concern is that accuratemental image identiﬁca-
tion could be the result of anunexpected correlation between the purely
visual signals evoked by viewing the three-letter cues and the predicted
224 T. Naselaris et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 215–228activity of the encoding model in response to the artwork. A control
analysis presented in the Supplementary Materials (Fig. S3) provides
explicit evidence that this is not the case: the three-letter cues present-
ed during the imagery runs could not be accurately identiﬁed using our
encodingmodel. Thus,we can safely discount circumstantial correlation
between the cues and the artwork as a potential confound.
Aﬁnal concern is related to the fact that the analysis ofmental image
identiﬁcation accuracy in Fig. 3 employed a set of 1000 randomly select-
ed photographs to compare against the artwork used in the perception
and imagery runs. It is possible that the activity measured during the
imagery runs encodes just enough information about the imagined art-
work to enable a coarse distinction between art and randomly selected
photographs. However, the mental image identiﬁcation analysis pre-
sented in Figs. 4 and 5 employed a set of images consisting primarily
of work by the very artists whose paintings and photographs were
used in our experiments. Thus, it appears that early visual areas encode
more about the details of speciﬁc mental images than a coarse distinc-
tion between art and random photographs.
Using mental images to drive machines
We have demonstrated that, in principle, activity generated during
mental imagery could be used to sort the results of an internet image
search. This demonstration establishes that current knowledge of visual
perception (embodied in the encoding model) could be used to exploit
mental imagery for brain–machine interfacing.Mental images are a rich
source of information about internal subjective states; however, unlike
internal speech, mental images are not easily communicated to others
using language. A brain–machine interface (BMI) that taps mental im-
agery could therefore enable a very useful newmode of communication.
Development along these lines should include an investigation of the
role that long-termmemory plays in enabling accuratemental imagery.
In this study, subjects were exposed to the imagined artwork during
perception runs that occurred just minutes before the onset of imagery
runs. It will be important to measure how the duration of the interval
between presentation and imagination affects mental imagery
decoding. Furthermore, although we consider fMRI in its current stage
of development to be an excellent tool for establishing the basic science
and algorithmic foundations for a BMI driven by mental imagery, the
fast, portable brain imaging technology that will be needed to produce
a practical BMI is a goal for future work.
Differences between mental imagery and perception
Our results show that decoding accuracy for mental imagery was
more variable than decoding accuracy for perception (compare
Figs. 4C to D; compare Figs. 4E to F). For mental images, decoding accu-
racy varied considerably across individual artworks (Fig. 4D) and across
individual subjects (Fig. 4F). The relative increase in variation of
decoding accuracy for mental imagery could be due to two potential
sources. The ﬁrst potential source is noise. During mental imagery
there is no driving input from a reliable stimulus (a static image in our
case) so it is not surprising that activity evoked by imagining a scene
is less reliable than activity evoked by seeing it. The second potential
source of difference between imagery and perception is bias. The mem-
ories upon which much of mental imagery is based are imperfect. It is
possible that even a noise-free mental image of an artwork could differ
from its perceptual counterpart if the mental image was in some way
distorted—a missing object, a blurred texture, etc.
Our data suggest that noise does indeed contribute to variation in
mental imagery decoding accuracy. As seen in Figs. 4A–B, decoding of
mental images is much more accurate for populations of 1000 well-
tuned voxels than for populations of 100, while for perceived images
there is little difference in decoding accuracy over this ten-fold increase
in population size. This ﬁnding suggests that the features needed to
identify most of the artworks are present in most populations of well-tuned voxels, but that during mental imagery the noise in the signal
makes pooling over 10 times more voxels much more beneﬁcial than
duringperception. Ultrahighﬁeld fMRI—which accommodates high res-
olution scanning (and therefore larger numbers of voxels) without cat-
astrophic loss of signal-to-noise—may therefore be invaluable for
studying mental imagery.
Our data provide some evidence that bias is also a source of variation
in mental image decoding accuracy. Figs. 4C and D show that there is
more variation in decoding accuracy across artworks in mental imagery
than during perception. Although noise may explain this variation,
there is some indication that mental images of some works of art may
be more distorted (relative to the original) than others. Supporting
this interpretation is the fact that El Greco's View of Toledo is signiﬁcant-
ly less likely to be ranked into the top 20% of images than would be ex-
pected by chance. This suggests that in our subject pool mental images
of El Greco's painting were consistently distorted with respect to the
painting itself.
Figs. 4E and F also show that there is more variation in decoding ac-
curacy across subjects for mental imagery than for perception. This ob-
servation is consistent with previous evidence that subjects vary in the
amount of V1 activation elicited by mental imagery (Cui et al., 2007).
Again, this variation could be due entirely to noise; however, it may
also be due to variation in the amount of distortion in the subjects'men-
tal images. An observation consistent with this interpretation is that for
subject 2 the imagined artworks are ranked in the top 25% signiﬁcantly
less often than would be expected by chance. This suggests that one or
more of this subject's mental images are systematically distorted in
ways that the other subjects' are not. Additional experiments will be
needed to conﬁrm these intriguing observations.
Materials and methods
Ethics statement
Experimental protocols were approved by the Institutional Review
Board at the University of Minnesota. Subjects gave written informed
consent prior to participation.
Subjects
Three healthy adult subjects with normal or corrected-to-normal vi-
sion participated in the experiment. Subject 2 was an author of the
study. Participants gave written informed consent before taking part
in the experiment. Prior to scanning sessions subjects were required
to thoroughly inspect and commit to memory ﬁve works of art
(Fig. 1A). Subjects were also required tomemorize a three-letter cue as-
sociated with each artwork.
Experimental design and stimuli
The experiment included four distinct types of runs (i.e., a set of
contiguous trials during which BOLD activity is measured): model-
ﬁtting, model-testing, perception, and imagery. Data from the
model-ﬁtting (Fig. 1B, left) runs were used to estimate the parame-
ters of voxel-wise encoding models (Figs. 1C, left and D). Data from
model-testing runs were used to calculate the prediction accuracy
of the encoding models. Data from the perception (Fig. 1B, middle)
and imagery (Fig. 1B, right) runs were used for the image identiﬁca-
tion analyses.
Duringmodel-ﬁtting runs 14° × 14° (400 × 400 pixels) color natural
photographs were presented (for an example see Fig. 1B, left). Subjects
were instructed toﬁxate on a colored square (0.14°, 4 pixels) at the cen-
ter of each photograph. The color of the ﬁxation spot changed three
times per second to ensure that it was visible regardless of the content
of the photographs. Photographs were presented in successive 2 s trials
(Fig. 1B). During each trial a “dummy” cue (the string “000” centered on
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600 ms, followed by a photograph presented for 1.4 s. The dummy cue
was included to ensure that trials during the model-ﬁtting runs would
have the same temporal sequence as trials during the perception and
imagery runs. During each 1.4 s presentation the photograph was
ﬂashed ON–OFF–ON–OFF–ON–OFF–ON where ON corresponds to the
presentation of the photograph for 0.2 s andOFF corresponds to the pre-
sentation of a gray screen for 0.2 s. Each trial was followed by an inter-
trial interval during which a gray screen of the same brightness as the
cue screen was presented. Inter-trial interval duration was speciﬁed in
units of TR (=2 s) and varied randomly from 1 to 1 + j TRs, where j
was sampled from a Poisson distribution with a mean parameter of
0.7. Each run began with a 24 s presentation of gray screen, and ended
with a 16 s presentation of gray screen. For each subject a total of 20
model-ﬁtting runs was completed. Each of the model-ﬁtting runs
consisted of 72 photographs presented two times each. Eight model-
testing runs were also completed. Model-testing runs had an identical
temporal design, but consisted of 12 photographs presented 12 times
each. The photographs presented during each model-ﬁtting and
model-testing run were randomly selected and mutually exclusive;
thus, a total of 1536 unique photographs were presented during the
28 model-ﬁtting/testing runs.
During perception runs 5 color works of art were presented (image
and ﬁxation square dimensions as above). The works of art were
“View of Toledo” (c. 1600) by Doménikos Theotokópoulos (El Greco);
“Night Sleeper” (1979) by Andrew Wyeth; “Betty” (1988) by Gerhard
Richter; “Ruhrtal” (1989) by Andreas Gursky; and “Horse Bath”
(2004) by Odd Nerdrum. Each trial consisted of a cue displayed for
0.6 s, followed by a 1.4 s stimulus epoch. The cue for each artwork
was a 3-letter abbreviation of the artists' name (“elg”, “gur”, “rch”,
“ner”, and “wyt”; same dimensions and location as dummy cue
above). A single artwork was presented during each perception epoch
using the same ON–OFF sequence as above. Intertrial intervals were
ﬁxed at 4 s. Each artwork was presented 12 times during each percep-
tion run.
Imagery runs were identical to perception runs in every way except
that during the stimulus epoch a slightly brightened gray screen (1.4%
brighter than the baseline illumination level of the cue screen) was
presented insteadof the cued artwork. Subjectswere instructed tomen-
tally project the cued artwork onto the slightly brightened gray screen
and to cease imagining it when the screen returned to the baseline illu-
mination level. Perception runs were always immediately followed by
imagery runs.
For subject 1 and subject 2, three perception and three imagery runs
were collected. For subject 3, six perception and six imagery runs were
collected.
Data from each subject were collected across 5 to 6 separate scan-
ning sessions spanning approximately 2 months. For subject 1 and sub-
ject 2 the ﬁrst two sessions consisted entirely of model-ﬁtting/testing
runs. For subject 3 model-ﬁtting/testing and at least one perception
and imagery run were collected during each session.MRI parameters
MRI data were collected at the Center for Magnetic Resonance Re-
search at the University of Minnesota (Minneapols, MN) using a 7-
Tesla Siemens MR scanner and an open-faced 4-channel loop
transmit/9-channel receive array coil speciﬁcally designed for high
resolution fMRI at 7 T (Adriany et al., 2012). Data were acquired
from 39 coronal slices that covered occipital cortex: slice thickness
1.5 mm, ﬁeld-of-view 167 mm × 167 mm. For functional data, a
T2*-weighted, single-shot, slice-interleaved, gradient-echo EPI pulse
sequence was used: matrix size 108 × 108, TR 2 s, TE = 0.021 s,
ﬂip angle 65°, GRAPPA acceleration factor = 2. The nominal spatial
resolution of the functional data was 1.5 mm × 1.5 mm × 1.5 mm.Data preprocessing
Functional volumes from each run were motion-corrected using
the FSL MCFLIRT routine. A brain-mask was extracted from the ﬁrst
run of the ﬁrst session using the FSL BET routine. All subsequent
analyses were performed on masked volumes. Runs across all 5–6
sessions were aligned to the ﬁrst run of the ﬁrst session by step-
wise application of the FSL FLIRT and FNIRT routines. For the FLIRT
registration step the normalized correlation cost-function was used
(–cost = ‘normcorr’). For the FNIRT registration step a warp reso-
lution of 5 mm (–warpres = 5,5,5) and a 4-stage sub-sampling
procedure (–subsamp = 4,2,1,1) were used. Inspection of the proc-
essed volumes revealed that nonlinear registration (i.e., FNIRT) using
these parameters noticeably improved the quality of cross-session reg-
istration relative to application of linear registration (i.e., FLIRT) alone.
Image transformation and deformation parameters obtained from the
MCFLIRT, FLIRT and FNIRT applications were concatenated and applied
to each volume using the FSL applyWarp routine. This motion correc-
tion and registration pipeline was implemented using the nipype Py-
thon library (Gorgolewski et al., 2011).
For each run and each individual voxel in the brain-masked volumes,
BOLD activities were normalized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1
and then detrended using a 3rd-order polynomial.
Visual areas V1 and V2 were identiﬁed in separate retinotopic map-
ping experiments. Borders of retinotopic areas were deﬁned using stan-
dard methods (Engel et al., 1997).
Encoding model
An encoding model was estimated for each individual voxel in the
brain-masked functional volume. Let vit be the (normalized and





hTτ f st−τð Þ þ ϵ:
Here st− τ is an image presented at time t− τ, f(s) is the image trans-
formation that implements a basicmodel of low-level visual processing,
the hτs are each a vector of model parameters that indicate the sensitiv-
ity to a particular feature at τ timesteps (each timestep is 2 s = 1 TR)
after image presentation (the superscript T indicates transposition),
and ϵ is zero-mean Gaussian additive noise. The transformation f(s) is
a Gaborwavelet transform of the image followed by a compressive non-
linearity:
f sð Þ ¼ log WTs
 þ 1 
where f is an F × 1 vector (F=570, the number of wavelets used for the
model),W denotes a matrix of complex Gabor wavelets, and | | denotes
an absolute value operation that removes phase sensitivity. W has as
many rows as there are pixels in s, and each column contains a different
Gabor wavelet; thus, W has dimensions 642 × 570 (images were
presented at a resolution of 400 × 400 pixels but were downsampled
to 64 × 64 pixels for this analysis). The features are the log of the mag-
nitudes obtained after ﬁltering the image by eachwavelet. The log is ap-
plied because we have found that a compressive nonlinearity improves
prediction accuracy.
The wavelets in W occur at ﬁve spatial frequencies: 2, 4, 8, 16 and
32 cycles per ﬁeld of view (FOV = 14°). Filters are positioned on a
square grid that covers the FOV, with spacing determined separately
for wavelets at each spatial frequency so that adjacentwavelets are sep-
arated by 3.5 standard deviations of the spatial Gaussian envelope. At
each grid position, wavelets occur at orientations of 0° and 90°.
The model parameters H= (hτ = 0,…, hτ = 10) were ﬁt using ridge
regression. Each component hτ is an F × 1 vector of weights so the
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ter was determined by testing 7 log-spaced values from 10 to
10,000,000. For each value of the regularization parameter the model
parameters H were estimated for each voxel and then prediction accu-
racy was measured using a single held-out model-ﬁtting run. For each
voxel themodel parameters H that yielded the highest prediction accu-
racy on this held-out run were retained for subsequent analysis. Model
prediction accuracy is the Pearson's correlation between predicted ac-
tivity and the measured activity on the model-testing runs.
Image identiﬁcation analysis
Decoding of external and mental images was performed using the
method of image identiﬁcation (Kay et al., 2008) (see Fig. S1A). In
image identiﬁcation, the activity of a population of voxels is used to
pick out an observed or imagined image from a gallery of images that
were not observed or imagined. Let V be a T×Nmatrix inwhich the col-
umns are time-series of T BOLD activity measurements, and the rows,
denoted as Vt, indicate the activity measured in the N voxels at time-
point t (these row-vectors are illustrated as dashed rectangles in
Fig. S1B). Let S = (s0, …, sT) be a sequence of images, and V
̂ Sð Þ be the
T × N matrix of activities predicted by the encoding model for each
voxel in response to the sequence S. We deﬁne the image identiﬁcation
score for the sequence S given the population V in a manner similar to
Kay et al. (2008):
score SjVð Þ ¼
Xt¼T
t¼0
Vt ; V^ t Sð Þ
D E
where 〈 ⋅ 〉 denotes Pearson's correlation (see Fig. S1 for an illustration).
Thus, at each time-point, the vector of responses across all N voxels is
correlated against the pattern of predicted responses across allN voxels.
These correlations are summed over time to generate the score for a
particular image sequence.
The image identiﬁcation accuracy for a particular population V is cal-
culated by comparing the score for the sequence of perceived/imagined
artwork to 1000 randomly selected sequences. Let Sart be the sequence
of artwork perceived/imagined during perception/imagery runs. In
this sequence st is set to a blank gray screen during inter-stimulus inter-
vals. The cue frames and slightly brighter gray frames presented during
the imagery runs are ignored. Let Srandm be themth of 1000 sequences of
images constructed by substituting each of the 5 works of art utilized in
the perception/imagery runs with 5 randomly selected images (blank
gray screens presented during inter-stimulus intervals are left in
place). We quantiﬁed image identiﬁcation accuracy for the voxel popu-
lation V as the number of hits:













For each subject we measured image identiﬁcation accuracy for
~1000 separate voxel populations (dots, squares and triangles in
Figs. 3 and S2). Voxel populationswere constructed according to the fol-
lowing procedure: (1) All voxels within the brain-masked functional
volume of a single subject were rank-ordered by their model prediction
accuracy (as calculated using the model-testing runs). The lowest
ranked voxel had the lowest prediction accuracy while highest ranked
voxel had the highest prediction accuracy. (2) The rank-ordered voxels
were binned into overlapping groups of 3000. Each group of 3000
contained the 1500 highest-ranked voxels of the group below it andthe 1500 lowest-ranked voxels of the group above it. (3) For each
group of 3000 voxels, R populations were constructed. Each population
consisted of 1000 voxels sampled randomly (without replacement)
from the group. For each subject the value of R was chosen so that the
total number of populations for the subject was ~1000. For subject 1
R = 9 and the total number of populations was 1116. For subject 2
R = 9 and the total number of populations was 1017. For subject 3
R=12 and the total number of populations was 1008. For each subject,
two special populations consisting of the 1000 voxels in V1 with the
highest model prediction accuracy (Figs. 3 and S2, triangles) and the
1000 voxels in V2 with highest model prediction accuracy (Figs. 3 and
S2, squares) were also constructed.
In Figs. 3 and S2 we investigate the relationship between the lower
bound onmodel prediction accuracy and image identiﬁcation accuracy.
The lower bound on prediction accuracy for a speciﬁc voxel population
is the model prediction accuracy for the lowest-ranked voxel within
the population. Let {V}x be the set of voxel populations with lower-
bound ≥ x (indicated on the x-axis of Fig. 3). The median curves in
Figs 3 and S2 show the median image identiﬁcation accuracy
(i.e., median number of hits) of all populations in {V}x as x varies in lin-
early spaced increments of 0.02. Thus, the leftmost point on themedian
curves shows the median identiﬁcation accuracy across each of the
~1000 populations; the rightmost point shows the median accuracy
for only the subset of populations with the highest model prediction
accuracy. Because the median is taken across fewer populations as
the lower-bound increases, the threshold for chance performance
(p b 0.01; gray shading in Figs. 3 and S2) increases monotonically.
Note that because Fig. S2 pools voxel populations from all three subjects
lower bounds were divided by the maximum lower bound for each
subject.
Hypothesis testing
We tested the hypothesis that median image identiﬁcation accuracy
for a particular lower bound is greater than chance. Chance, in this case,
corresponds to drawing n numbers from a uniform distribution over the
integers between 1 and 1000, and then taking themedian. Here, n is the
number of voxel populations with a given lower-bound on prediction
accuracy (as speciﬁed by the x-axis in Figs. 3 and S2). In the analysis
of Fig. 3, n decreases as we move from left to right on the x-axis, and
thismust obviously be taken into accountwhen computing signiﬁcance.
Thus, the hypothesis testingprocedurewas implemented as follows: Let
randscores= (score(S1rand|Vk), …, score(S1000rand |Vk)) be the set of scores
assigned to 1000 random image sequences for population Vk ∈ {V}x.
For each populationVk in {V}x, score(Sart|Vk) is swappedwith a randomly
selected score from randscores. Then hits(Vk) is recalculated for each
population Vk and the median image identiﬁcation accuracy across all
populations in {V}x is determined. This procedure was performed
10,000 times for each {V}x resulting in a distribution of median hits for
each value of the lower bound x. The 99th percentile of this distribution
(corresponding to p b0 .01) is indicated by gray shading in Figs. 3 and
S2. This value grows as the lower bound increases because the number
of populations in {V}x shrinks as the lower bound x increases.
Sorting of art galleries
We consider a scenario in which brain activity generated by imagin-
ing a speciﬁc artwork is used to sort the images returned by an internet
query on the artist's name. The procedure for sorting the images was
similar to the image identiﬁcation analysis described in the Image
identiﬁcation analysis section. In this case the imagined artwork for
each artist was substituted with a different artwork by the same artist
(instead of a randomly selected image). The details of the sorting proce-
dure were as follows. A Google Images query was performed on the
name of the artist of each of the ﬁve perceived/imagined works of art
used in our experiment. The ﬁrst 100 images returned from each
227T. Naselaris et al. / NeuroImage 105 (2015) 215–228query were downloaded and saved. The majority of images returned by
the queries were works by the artist, although book jackets, gallery
photos, text, photographs of the artist, and miscellaneous images were
sometimes returned. Let Smgur be a sequence of images formed by
substituting into Sart the mth image returned for the query “Andreas
Gursky” (the other four works of art remain in place). For a speciﬁc
voxel population V, score(Smgur|V) was calculated for each of the
m ∈ [1, 100] substitutions. These scores, along with score(Sart|V), were
sorted from lowest to highest and the resulting rank of score(Sart|V)
was retained. This procedure was performed independently for each
artist using 100 voxel populations of size 100, 1000, and 10,000 (for a
total of 300 populations per subject). Voxel populationswere construct-
ed by random sampling from the group of 30,000 voxels with the
highest model prediction accuracies. For each population size the
ranks obtained for Sart were combined across all populations, artists,
and subjects to generate the cumulative density plots in Figs. 4A and
B. Chance performance on this image-sorting task (gray curves in
Figs. 4A and B) was computed by generating 10,000 cumulative histo-
grams obtained by random permutation of rankings for each artwork,
voxel population, and subject. In Figs. 4C and D, data for all subjects
were pooled, the number of voxels per population was ﬁxed at 1000,
and rankings were calculated for each artwork independently. In
Figs. 4E and F, data for all artworks were pooled, the number of voxels
per population was ﬁxed at 1000, and rankings were calculated for
each subject independently.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.10.018.
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